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Republicans control bothhouses of Congress as well asthe presidency. Control means
accountability, and large federal
budget deficits do not harmonize
with the Republican self-image of
fiscal prudence. Thus, one of the top
agenda items this spring and summer
will be how to reduce the federal
budget deficit.
President Bush and congres-
sional leaders have ruled out tax in-
creases. This leaves only two ways of
reducing the deficit: either spending
will have to be reduced or we can
hope to experience an unexpected
boom in economic growth. Basing
fiscal policy on hope is not prudent,
so most observers think that the
president and Congress will try to
reduce spending. Agricultural spend-
ing is again on the table for budget
cuts. Senator Judd Gregg of New
Hampshire, chairman of the Senate
Budget Committee, says that he will
scrutinize farm programs and that
“Agricultural entitlements are crying
out to be reformed.” Farm groups are
working both to forestall cuts to
farm programs and to figure out
where cuts should be made if they
are inevitable.
An optimistic way of looking at
spending cuts is that they present an
opportunity to improve program per-
formance. After all, reducing farm
spending will not inevitably harm
farmers. For example, land owners
will bear the brunt of cuts to com-
modity programs through a decline
in land rents and land prices. Be-
cause most farmland is owned by
absentee landlords, such cuts will
have a smaller impact on farm opera-
tors than would seem likely. In addi-
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tion, smart reforms of farm programs
could result in both lower costs and
better farm programs. Replacing the
marketing loan program with an ex-
panded countercyclical payment
program would make U.S. farm pro-
grams more compliant with World
Trade Organization negotiations and
would reduce spending while leav-
ing the U.S. farm safety net largely in
place. Another program that is ripe
for reform is the U.S. crop insurance
program. One simple change would
be to eliminate the option whereby
farmers can insure against losses on
a field-by-field basis. As will be dem-
onstrated, elimination of this option
would save taxpayers more than
$300 million while having no impact
on the ability of the crop insurance
program to meet its primary purpose
of providing assistance when farm
income is low.
Before getting into the details of
such a crop insurance reform, it is
useful to take a brief detour into our
federal government’s books to see
why farm groups’ fears of spending
cuts are well founded.
A “GUNS AND BUTTER” FEDERAL
FISCAL POLICY
The best way to understand our fed-
eral fiscal policy is to measure tax re-
ceipts, government expenditures, and
the resulting deficit or surplus as a
percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP). GDP is the most inclusive mea-
sure of the income of a country, so
adjusting taxes and spending by GDP
can help give a better perspective of
their relative magnitude.
Figure 1 shows federal tax re-
ceipts, outlays, and deficits since
1980 expressed as a percentage of
GDP. As shown, total outlays were
fairly constant at about 22 percent of
GDP until about 1992, at which time
they began a long decline that was
reversed in fiscal year 2002 (which
runs from October 1, 2001 to Septem-
ber 30, 2002). This reversal can be
explained by fairly large increases in
both defense and non-defense
FIGURE 1. TOTAL FEDERAL RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
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spending, which came about be-
cause Congress did away with the
“pay-as-you-go” rules that restrained
spending throughout President
Clinton’s two terms in office.
The pattern of tax receipts more
closely follows the business cycle.
The deep recession in the early
1980s and the milder recession in the
early 1990s show up as declines in
receipts. Congress passed tax in-
creases in 1993, which, combined
with the economic growth in the
1990s, grew federal tax receipts to
above 20 percent of GDP. This growth
in tax revenue, combined with
spending restraint, led to budget sur-
pluses from 1998 to 2001. A mild re-
cession in 2001 and tax cuts passed
by Congress have led to a dramatic
downturn in federal tax receipts.
This drop in receipts, combined with
an increase in spending, has in-
creased the budget deficit to about
3.5 percent of GDP.
Apologists note that the deficits
are not as large as they were in the
mid-1980s when they were regularly
5 percent of GDP. However, the rea-
son they are not as large is that we
are generating a large surplus in the
so-called off-budget accounts, which
consist primarily of the social secu-
rity surplus. This surplus was created
by policy reforms (tax increases and
benefit cuts) in the mid-1980s. We are
currently running a surplus of about
1.5 percent of GDP in this fund. When
this surplus is accounted for, we are
running budget deficits of about 5
percent of GDP.
Subtracting the off-budget sur-
plus shows a clearer picture of fed-
eral finances. After all, social
security surpluses are being gener-
ated today so that we have the finan-
cial resources to pay promised
benefits tomorrow. It is this last pic-
ture of federal finances that has
many economists worried that we
are truly pursuing a “guns and but-
ter” fiscal policy whereby we are bor-
rowing about 5 percent of GDP from
overseas lenders to pay for our guns
(military spending) and butter (do-
mestic programs).
The Congressional Budget Of-
fice projects that the budget deficit
will be reduced to around 2 percent
of GDP by 2010. But this is an unreal-
istic projection on which to base
policy because it makes two ques-
tionable assumptions: that Presi-
dent Bush’s tax cuts will be
rescinded and that the alternative
minimum tax will not be reformed or
eliminated. Thus, cutting spending
really is the only tool deficit hawks
can use to cut the deficit.
Figure 2 gives a breakdown of
our federal spending. Nondiscre-
tionary spending and interest on the
debt are considered off limits to bud-
get cutters. This eliminates fully 61
percent of the budget. Thus, spend-
ing cuts must come from discretion-
ary spending.
In the short run, it is unlikely
that Congress will cut military
spending because of President
Bush’s Iraq commitment. In fact,
holding defense spending constant
will require a significant reduction
in planned expansion of weapon
systems. Thus, we are left with cut-
ting non-defense, non-discretionary
savings, which accounts for 19 per-
cent of the federal budget.
To illustrate the problem facing
deficit hawks, if all non-defense, non-
discretionary outlays were entirely
eliminated, this would reduce total
spending by 3.1 percent of GDP. As
shown in Figure 1, a spending cut of
this magnitude would not eliminate
the budget deficit. We would still be
in red ink but the National Weather
Service, National Science Founda-
tion, National Institutes of Health,
National Parks System, FBI, EPA, De-
partment of Education, U.S. farm pro-
grams, and many other federal
programs funded out of discretion-
ary spending would be gone.
This brief exploration of the
problem facing budget cutters shows
why they will be taking a hard look
at all agencies and programs for ar-
eas where efficiencies can be in-
creased or programs can be
eliminated. And agricultural pro-
grams are a prime target.
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SAVING MONEY FROM SMART REFORM
OF THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM
The crop insurance program pro-
vides an example of a smart reform
that can both save money and im-
prove the program. To understand
how this might work, we must first
review some program details.
Congress last reformed the crop
insurance program in 2000 by signifi-
cantly increasing the subsidies farm-
ers receive when they buy more
expensive, lower deductible policies.
The new subsidies resulted in a sig-
nificant increase is the amount of
insurance that U.S. farmers purchase
each year, which was the objective of
the reform. Total (unsubsidized)
crop insurance premiums, which are
the best measure of the size of the
program, have increased 68 percent
since 2000.
This growth in the program is a
direct result of the way that farmers
receive their subsidies. Congress
mandated that per acre subsidies
must be proportionate to total pre-
miums. Thus, the more farmers pay
for insurance, the more they receive
in subsidies. Farmers have many
choices in the program. They choose
which products to buy (Revenue As-
surance, Crop Revenue Coverage, or
standard yield insurance); the level
of coverage to purchase; and
whether to insure their fields in sepa-
rate insurance units or to combine
them into a single unit.
The particular subsidy propor-
tions chosen by Congress create an
incentive for most farmers to buy
insurance at the 75 percent coverage
level (a 25 percent deductible). At
this coverage level, farmers pay only
$45 for each $100 worth of insurance
that they purchase. This creates a
large incentive for farmers to pur-
chase the most expensive insurance
that is available to them. The most
expensive insurance available is Rev-
enue Assurance with the harvest
price option (or Crop Revenue Cover-
age, which gives equivalent cover-
age) and insuring crops on a
field-by-field basis, which is known
as buying “optional units.” It is this
incentive for buying optional units
that could allow a large impact un-
der smart reform.
OPTIONAL UNITS IN CROP INSURANCE
Farmers who grow a crop on more
than one section of land can create a
separate insurance unit—an “op-
tional unit”—for the land in each
section. Each optional unit stands
alone when it comes time to calcu-
late premiums and indemnities. If
hail damages a crop on one unit, the
farmer will receive an insurance in-
demnity to cover the hail losses. This
payment arrives even if the farmer’s
other field units receive beneficial
rainfall instead of hail.
The alternative to optional units
is to insure all of a farmer’s crop in a
single insurance unit. The insurance
guarantee on this single unit is ex-
actly equal to the sum of the insur-
ance guarantees on the optional
units. However, the frequency of in-
surance payments will be lower on
the single unit because production
from all fields is pooled together
when calculating whether there is a
loss. Reflecting this lower frequency
of payments, USDA charges a 10 per-
cent insurance surcharge for op-
tional unit coverage.
Why would farmers pay a pre-
mium surcharge for no increase in
their insurance guarantee? The ex-
planation, of course, is that because
of the proportionate subsidies, farm-
ers only pay a surcharge of 4.5 per-
cent. What farmer would not pay 45¢
for coverage that returns $1.00? Ap-
proximately 90 percent of land en-
rolled in the crop insurance program
is enrolled as optional units.
A smart reform of the crop insur-
ance program would be to either
eliminate the ability of farmers to buy
optional unit coverage or to elimi-
nate the additional subsidy that farm-
ers receive for buying optional unit
coverage. The first reform option has
the added benefit of a reduction in
fraud and abuse of the program by
making it more difficult for dishonest
farmers to “move” production among
fields either to make false insurance
claims or to build up a higher yield
history on a particular field in order
to increase its eligibility for higher
future levels of insurance.
COST SAVINGS FROM SMART REFORM
Significant cost savings would ac-
crue from elimination of optional
unit coverage. Table 1 (page 5) sum-
marizes the estimated changes in
taxpayer costs from this reform for
fiscal year 2006, assuming that 90
percent of acreage is insured under
optional units. Reducing premiums
by 10 percent on 90 percent of the
business reduces expected insur-
ance payouts, cost reimbursements
to crop insurance companies, and
underwriting gains by 8.18 percent.
Taxpayer costs of this program
could be reduced by approximately
$330 million. And because the total
FIGURE 2. FEDERAL SPENDING CATEGORIES
Continued on page 5
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The World Trade Organization(WTO) negotiations under theDoha Round are slowly pro-
gressing toward an eventual new
agreement on agriculture. A new
framework for the agriculture agree-
ment was approved by the WTO
membership in August 2004. The
changes in the guidelines for domes-
tic support could have effects on
many countries and many types of
support. However, details on the spe-
cific regulations of the agreement
have yet to be determined. Dramatic
reforms in agriculture could take
place under the framework, but the
decisions made to implement the
framework will determine if that po-
tential is realized. If countries lack
ambition and commitment to make
genuine reforms, changes in support
will not happen in this round.
Governments provide support to
agriculture in numerous ways, for
example, direct payments, research
grants, loan programs, and storage
programs to name a few. Under the
current Uruguay Round Agreement
on Agriculture (URAA), domestic
support programs are divided into
three “boxes” that indicate the trade-
distorting effects of the programs.
“Green Box” programs are consid-
ered minimally trade distorting. The
agreement sets out specific guide-
lines for the structure of such pro-
grams but does not set limits on
these program expenditures by WTO
members. “Blue Box” programs are
considered more trade distorting but
have production limits embedded in
them. These programs also are not
limited under the current agreement.
Rethinking Agricultural Domestic Support under the
World Trade Organization
All other programs are “Amber Box”
programs. Amber Box programs are
considered the most trade distorting
and are limited under the current
agreement. Within the Amber Box,
programs are classified as product-
specific or non-product-specific.
These classifications determine the
so-called de minimis rules, by which
certain Amber Box programs may be
exempt from domestic support lim-
its. Support that counts against the
limits is referred to as the Aggregate
Measure of Support (AMS).
THE NEW FRAMEWORK,
RECENT POLICY CHANGES,
AND WTO RULINGS
The newly agreed upon framework for
agricultural domestic support is tar-
geted at achieving substantial reduc-
tions in trade-distorting support, the
Amber and Blue Box programs. New
limits are put in place on de minimis
support, Blue Box support, and the
product-specific AMS. Total support,
as measured by the sum of AMS, de
minimis, and Blue Box support, is to
be limited. This limit on total support
will be tightened during the imple-
mentation period. All member states
face a 20 percent reduction in the to-
tal support limit in the first year of
implementation. This reduction is
referred to as the “down payment.”
Recent estimates indicate the United
States would have a total support
limit of $49 billion per year at the
start of the new agreement; a 20 per-
cent reduction would lower the limit
to $39 billion. Additional reductions
in the total support limit will be
based on a tiered formula that is yet
to be determined. However, the for-
mula will result in larger reductions
for WTO members that have higher
levels of permitted support.
Total AMS and de minimis per-
mitted levels will also be reduced
over the implementation period.
The agreement stipulates that prod-
uct-specific AMS and Blue Box sup-
port should only be capped, rather
than reduced. However, the frame-
work states that the required reduc-
tions in total support and total AMS
should also result in reductions in
product-specific support. The Blue
Box has been redefined to include
direct payment schemes that are ei-
ther production limiting or do not
require production at all. A member
state’s limit for Blue Box support will
be based on 5 percent of its average
total value of agricultural production
over a historical period or the
amount of existing Blue Box pay-
ments over a historical period, which-
ever is higher. Green Box guidelines
are to be reviewed to ensure that all
WTO SUPPORT CATEGORIES
Amber Box Support. Domestic poli-
cies that have a direct effect on pro-
duction and trade. WTO members
calculate how much support of this
kind they provide per year for the
agricultural sector (using calcula-
tions known as “total aggregate mea-
surement of support” or “Total AMS”).
Green Box Support. Measures with
minimal impact on trade, which can
be used freely. They include pay-
ments made directly to farmers that
do not stimulate production, such
as certain forms of direct income
support, assistance to help farmers
restructure agriculture, and direct
payments under environmental and
regional assistance programs.
Blue Box Support. Direct payments
to farmers whereby the farmers are
required to limit production. The
new framework would also include
direct payments based on a fixed
base that do not require production
in the blue box.
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insurance guarantee would remain
the same for farmers, this cost sav-
ings comes about with absolutely
no impact on the ability of the crop
insurance program to provide in-
come support when a farmer’s mar-
ket income falls short of the
insurance guarantee.
IS SMART REFORM DOABLE?
The word around Washington is that
departments and agencies are being
asked to identify perhaps 8 percent
of their budgets that can be cut. If
these cuts were to be made on a pro-
gram-by-program basis, then the
USDA’s Risk Management Agency
would be forced to cut projected
spending by 8 percent. Elimination
of optional unit coverage would ac-
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN TAXPAYER COSTS FROM CROP INSURANCE
REFORM (FY 2006)
Current Program No Optional Units
(billion $) (billion $)
Total premiums 4.00 3.67
Total indemnities 4.30 3.95
Total premium subsidies 2.37 2.17
Administrative and operating cost 0.92 0.84
Underwriting gains 0.40 0.37
Taxpayer cost of crop insurance 3.99 3.66
complish this 8 percent cut in the
crop insurance program with no im-
pact on the total amount of insur-
ance provided to U.S. farmers.
Of course, the beneficiaries of
optional units can be expected to
fight their elimination. The primary
beneficiaries are crop insurance
agents, who will find that their com-
missions will be cut by about 8 per-
cent; crop insurance companies,
which will have reduced underwrit-
ing gains; and farmers, who will
have reduced payments. But if cuts
are going to be made, one would
hope that they are made with an
objective of doing the least harm to
the mission of the agency or pro-
gram being cut. Elimination of op-
tional units is the type of reform
that makes sense in an era of scarce
federal resources. ◆
Guns and Butter
Continued from page 3
Green Box programs are minimally
trade or production distorting.
Both the United States and the
European Union have significantly
altered their agricultural programs
over the last few years. They have
moved a great deal of their subsidies
to direct payments to agricultural en-
tities. The U.S. direct and counter-
cyclical payments and the E.U. Single
Farm Payments all fit the description
of direct payments. Given the current
structure of the Green Box and the
new definition of the Blue Box, U.S.
direct payments and E.U. Single Farm
Payments would be filed as Green Box.
U.S. countercyclical payments would
go in the Blue Box. These moves give
the United States and the European
Union a great deal of flexibility in deal-
ing with the proposed reductions.
However, the WTO panel ruling
on the Brazil-U.S. cotton dispute has
concluded that U.S. direct payments
“do not fully conform” to the guide-
lines for Green Box direct payments
because of their exclusion of fruit
and vegetable production on the
payment-base acreage. By the same
measure, E.U. Single Farm Payments,
too, would not conform to the
Green Box requirements. However, it
should be relatively easy to fix both
issues, so this is probably of minor
concern to U.S. and E.U. negotiators.
The framework explicitly states
that the reductions in total AMS per-
mitted levels “will result in reduc-
tions of some product-specific
support.” But true reductions may
not materialize because there are
loopholes in market price support
(MPS) programs, and member states
still have flexibility to provide sup-
port through other mechanisms. The
change in Japanese rice policy in the
late 1990s provides one example of
an MPS loophole. Another example
would be if the United States made
superficial changes to the dairy and
sugar programs to fulfill a target in
product-specific support reductions
without truly affecting actual sup-
port. The United States could also
lower loan rates in the marketing
loan program (reducing product-
specific AMS) and augment the
countercyclical program to make up
the support difference (by changing
the target price). Aggregate support
would remain the same but would
shift from the Amber Box to the Blue
Box. The ability of reductions in total
AMS permitted levels to force reduc-
tions in product-specific support will
also hinge on the product-specific
AMS limits. These limits have yet to
be determined, although the frame-
work does state that the limits will be
based on “respective average lev-
els.” To guarantee product-specific
support reductions, the final level
of total permitted AMS must be less
than the sum of the product-spe-
cific AMS limits.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
MOVING FORWARD
The issues embedded in the current
WTO agriculture negotiations are
numerous because of the multitude
of agricultural programs used by
member states throughout the
world. Putting all of the programs
into categories has allowed negotia-
tors and their advisers to condense
this support into manageable points
so that further clarifications can be
Continued on page 11
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Planting Decisions: Corn versus Soybeans
Agricultural Situation
Spotlight
Chad E. Hart
chart@iastate.edu
515-294-9911
T he recent discovery of soy-bean rust in the UnitedStates has prompted many
agricultural pundits to predict
more corn acres will be planted in
the coming crop year. While soy-
bean rust may cause some shift
from soybeans to corn, producers
have already begun such a shift and
will likely continue regardless of
the presence of soybean rust. Fig-
ure 1 shows that Iowa soybean acre-
age reached its peak in 2001. Since
then, corn acreage has risen by
nearly 9 percent while soybean
acreage has declined by over 7 per-
cent. Three major factors explain
this shift: trend yields, variable
costs, and prices. If we look at these
factors over the past several years,
corn has outpaced or matched soy-
beans in all three areas. Corn trend
yields are growing relatively faster
than are soybean trend yields. Vari-
able costs of production for corn
are maintaining a consistent margin
with those for soybeans. Futures
prices for corn are relatively stron-
ger than are those for soybeans.
Figure 2 contains actual and
trend yields for Iowa corn and soy-
beans. Two trend lines are given for
each crop. One shows a 1980 to 1997
trend, which represents the informa-
tion that was available to farmers
before planting their crops in 1998.
The other shows the trend from 1980
to 2004, representing currently avail-
able information.
A comparison of the two sets of
trend yields demonstrates that
yields in the late 1990s and early
2000s have pushed the corn trend
higher, while the soybean trend re-
mains roughly the same. In 1998, the
corn trend yield was 129 bushels per
acre, 2.9 times the soybean trend
yield of 44 bushels per acre. In 2005,
the corn trend yield is 156 bushels
per acre, 3.4 times the soybean trend
yield of 46 bushels per acre. Given
corn’s growing advantage in trend
yields, for soybeans to be competi-
tive, soybean prices must be rela-
tively higher than corn prices or
soybean costs must be relatively
lower. Neither of these is turning out
to be the case.
FIGURE 1. CORN AND SOYBEAN PLANTED AREA IN IOWA
FIGURE 2. IOWA CORN AND SOYBEAN ACTUAL YIELDS AND YIELD TRENDS
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USDA has tracked agricultural
production costs for many years. The
upper section of Table 1 shows the
variable (or operating) costs for pro-
ducing corn and soybeans in the
Heartland region, which includes
Iowa. Cost figures after 2003 have not
yet been published. These figures
show corn variable costs are roughly
double the variable costs for soy-
beans. Going back to 1996, this cost
relationship has been fairly steady. So
variable costs have not moved in fa-
vor of either crop for quite some time.
The middle section of Table 1
shows the expected prices for the
crops before planting. For these
prices, we gathered the futures
prices in mid-January on the harvest
futures contracts for corn and soy-
beans. Looking at the ratio of the
corn and soybean prices, corn
reached its high point in 2002 when
its expected price was 53 percent of
the soybean price. Since then, the
price ratio has moved in soybeans’
favor—until this year. In 2005, the
ratio is 0.42, slightly below the 10-
year average. So current prices also
are not favoring either crop.
The bottom section of Table 1
shows the expected net returns for
each crop. The net returns are based
on the expected prices, trend yields,
and variable costs for each year. The
variable costs from 2003 are used for
2004-05. In each year, corn expected
net returns have exceeded soybean
expected net returns. This is a fair
comparison because lower fertilizer
costs from planting corn after soy-
beans are accounted for in USDA
cost figures. In fact, going back even
further, corn expected net returns
have surpassed soybean expected
net returns in 9 of the past 10 years.
Given that the expected net returns
are higher for corn, it is not surpris-
ing that Iowa farmers have been
shifting from soybeans to corn.
The additional threat of soybean
rust is not creating a new incentive
to move to corn but is actually just
reinforcing the shift. Soybean rust
could affect production and planting
decisions in several ways. First, if
FIGURE 3. SOYBEAN PRICES NEEDED TO HAVE EXPECTED NET RETURNS
EQUAL TO CORN
TABLE 1. VARIABLE COSTS, EXPECTED PRICES, AND EXPECTED NET RETURNS
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Variable Costs ($ per acre)
Corn 152.00 134.97 150.40
Soybeans 78.27 70.26 75.38
Expected Price ($ per bushel)
Corn 2.58 2.37 2.44 2.52 2.37
Soybeans 5.07 4.43 5.23 6.41 5.60
Expected Net Return ($ per acre)
Corn 226.40 218.03 218.59 236.43 218.81
Soybeans 146.16 127.57 160.22 215.89 181.27
Continued on page 9
soybean rust does spread during the
growing season, soybean producers
will face additional variable costs for
fungicides. Estimates of the addi-
tional costs range from $16 to $35
per acre, depending on the fungicide
used, the number of applications,
and the severity of the outbreak.
This will drive down soybean net
returns and make corn relatively
more attractive. Second, areas where
soybean rust is more likely to be
present may shift to alternative
crops. Given the biology of soybean
rust, southern states are more likely
to face rust problems. Corn, cotton,
and rice acreage in these areas may
increase and the additional produc-
tion from these acres would put
downward pressure on prices for
these crops. This change could also
spur higher soybean prices. These
price changes would support more
soybean acres in Iowa. The net effect
of soybean rust on expected net re-
turns is uncertain.
Figure 3 shows the soybean
prices that would be needed to
make corn and soybean expected
net returns comparable with and
without soybean rust. For the soy-
bean rust scenario, additional costs
of $25 per acre are assumed. Given
this additional cost, an extra 55¢ per
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Animal Identification Is Key to Restarting Beef Exports to Japan
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December 26, 2004, markedone year since Japan bannedimports of U.S. beef follow-
ing the discovery of bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy (BSE) in an
imported animal. The loss of more
than 375,000 metric tons (mt) of U.S.
beef and beef variety meats created
a shortfall in supply that Japan has
been unable to fill. Australian ex-
ports to Japan were 41 percent
higher in 2004 than in 2003, but Aus-
tralia and other countries cannot
supply the volume and types of beef
the United States had supplied.
Japan’s search for alternative
suppliers includes China. Although
China has problems with foot-and-
mouth disease and other sanitary
issues, Japan has sourced small
quantities of inexpensive, heat-
treated beef for gyudon—a popular
lunch meal of beef and rice served
in bowls. Japan is likely to increase
these imports as the Japanese Min-
istry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries (MAFF) approves addi-
tional processing plants. This will-
ingness to source beef from China is
an indication of how badly Japan
needs to increase beef imports.
Shortly before the U.S. presiden-
tial election, Japan and the United
States signed an agreement outlin-
ing the conditions necessary to re-
sume imports of some U.S. beef
under an interim trade program. In
retrospect, USDA’s statement that
“several weeks will be required for
the resumption of sales” was overly
optimistic, and several conditions
of the agreement have proven prob-
lematic. Briefly, conditions to re-
start trade include a Beef Export
Verification Program, managed by
the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing
Service, to ensure the following in-
dustry practices are implemented.
• Specified risk materials
(SRMs) must be removed from
animals of all ages.
• Beef items, including offals
and variety meats, must be
derived from cattle verified to
be 20 months of age or
younger.
• Cattle must be traceable
through live animal
production records that
indicate the animals are 20
months of age or younger at
the time of slaughter. Records
must be based on (a)
individual animal age
verification, (b) group age
verification, (c) insemination
age verification, or (d) USDA
Process Verified Animal
Identification and Data
Collection Services.
In addition, the USDA would docu-
ment how physiological maturity
using carcass grading and quality
attributes can be used to determine
chronological age.
Conditions for the Japanese side
included revising domestic rules
from requiring 100 percent BSE test-
ing to testing of animals 21 months
and older. Members of Japan’s Liberal
Democratic Party have resisted this
change and asked that public hear-
ings be held before the law is re-
vised. U.S. consumers may have
reacted with relative equanimity to a
case of BSE in the domestic herd, but
Japanese consumers did not. The
first case of BSE in Japan, confirmed
in September 2001, caused immedi-
ate and dramatic consumer reaction
against both domestic and imported
beef. Following recovery in beef con-
sumption and despite 14 confirmed
cases of BSE in Japan, demand for
domestic beef remains strong be-
cause consumers know every animal
is being tested. Japanese policy-
makers are understandably con-
cerned about potential damage to
the domestic industry as a result of
resuming trade with the United
States and have yet to lift the policy
of blanket testing for cattle. Japan
also needed legislation permitting
imports of beef from animals 20
months and younger.
Under the interim trade agree-
ment, U.S. supply will not be a prob-
lem. The USDA estimates that
approximately 70 percent of the 35
million U.S. cattle slaughtered each
year are steers and heifers 20 months
or younger. This estimate means the
United States will slaughter 23.5 mil-
lion heifers and steers and produce
more than 8 million mt of beef meet-
ing Japan’s age requirement.
However, a major point of conten-
tion in restarting exports is that most
of these animals do not meet the
agreement’s criteria for age verifica-
tion. Beef industry sources estimate
that only 10 to 20 percent of U.S.
cattle are covered by the appropriate
documentation to confirm age.
The USDA’s physiological matu-
rity study was recently analyzed by
the Japanese government. Japan re-
portedly may accept beef from ani-
mals that fit the “A40” quality
category, which has been shown to
cover an age bracket between 12 and
17 months. USDA estimates that 35
percent of U.S. slaughter cattle fit
this category. An agreement to ac-
cept A40 beef would allow addi-
tional beef to be harvested for Japan,
but further negotiations will delay
the resumption of trade.
Compared with many other
countries, the United States has
been slow to adopt a system that
would provide age verification of all
cattle. The U.S. National Animal Iden-
tification System (NAIS) is under de-
velopment but, at least initially, will
be voluntary. By comparison,
Canada’s national animal identifica-
tion system received strong ap-
proval from Japanese MAFF officials
who made an inspection mission to
Canada and the United States in late
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bushel of soybeans would be needed
to offset the costs and maintain net
returns. With a corn price of $2.37
per bushel (the futures price for corn
on January 7) and assuming no soy-
bean rust problems, soybean prices
would need to move up to $6.42 per
bushel (82¢ higher than the soybean
futures price on January 7) to match
expected net returns with corn. With
soybean rust, soybean prices would
need to increase to nearly $7 per
bushel. Of course, $7 soybeans are
quite possible if rust significantly
reduces yields or causes major acre-
age shifts out of soybeans and into
corn. But, at least so far, the futures
market is discounting the possibility
of either event happening. ◆
2004. Canada has been out of the
Japanese market since May 2003 be-
cause of BSE, but the Canadian
cattle identification system will be a
cornerstone of Canada’s efforts to
reenter the Japanese market.
Both Canada and the USDA be-
lieve effective firewalls are in place
to ensure cattle suspected of hav-
ing BSE are removed from the North
American herd and kept from enter-
ing the food system. The United
States has named Canada a “mini-
mum-risk region,” which means the
Canadian industry meets risk stan-
dards that (a) prohibit specified risk
materials in human food; (b) imple-
ment a ruminant-to-ruminant feed
ban; (c) restrict imports to minimize
exposure to BSE; (d) use surveil-
lance procedures that meet or ex-
ceed international guidelines; and
(e) use epidemiological investiga-
tions, risk assessment, and risk miti-
gation measures.
Canada’s third case of BSE cre-
ated renewed concern in the U.S.
beef industry, with some groups urg-
ing the U.S. government to keep the
border closed to live cattle. How-
ever, both countries had acknowl-
edged the possibility of additional
cases, and the United States is pro-
ceeding with its decision to allow
imports of live cattle under 30
months of age and other specified
animals and products from Canada.
On March 7, 2005, the United States
and Canada will once again become
a North American market.
Based on the importance Japan
places on documented age verifica-
tion and Canada’s adoption of a na-
tional identification system, opening
the U.S. border to live Canadian
cattle should not slow U.S. efforts to
reenter the Japanese import market.
On the other hand, additional nego-
tiations will be required to compen-
sate for the U.S. industry’s slow
uptake of animal identification, age
verification, and traceability systems.
Further, being banned from the U.S.
market forced Canada to increase
slaughter capacity. This means the
Canadians will have more beef to sell
and can market their source-identi-
fied product as being distinctly differ-
ent from most U.S. beef.
Of greater concern than opening
the border is that, once access is
granted, exporters are likely to face
consumer resistance to U.S. beef. Con-
sumer polls indicate that between
two-thirds and three-fourths of Japa-
nese consumers say they will not buy
U.S. beef when it becomes available.
Given this consumer attitude, mar-
kets for less-expensive cuts of U.S.
beef will exist in food service outlets
where source identification is not
required. However, convincing con-
sumers to purchase more-expensive
cuts from retail outlets that require
country-of-origin labeling and from
restaurants that provide source iden-
tification will be a much harder sell.
Experience has given the Japa-
nese government a strong incentive
to respond to consumer concerns.
Traceability of livestock and other
food products is a high priority in Ja-
pan, and supermarkets and other
food suppliers have been quick to
embrace traceability as part of con-
sumer assurance programs. The in-
tent of the U.S. NAIS is to allow for
rapid tracking of animals in case of
disease outbreaks. However, because
the system would provide both docu-
mentation of age and traceability
from birth to the doors of the slaugh-
ter plant, adoption of the system
would be a major step forward in sat-
isfying Japanese concerns about ani-
mal identification and traceability
and perhaps in avoiding extended
import bans in the event of future ani-
mal disease or meat safety issues. ◆
Compared with many
other countries,
the United States has
been slow to adopt
a system that would
provide age
verification of all cattle.
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The United States is the fourth-largest producer ofsugar and has well-developed sugarcane andsugar beet industries. However, since the 1970s,
high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) has gained popularity
with food processors as a sweetener, a change stimu-
lated by sugar agricultural policies that have raised the
price of sugar well above its world level, and the emer-
gence of cheaper sweeteners based on corn. Nearly 7.3
percent of total corn production (2.2 million bushels)
was used to produce HFCS in 2003/04. The United States
is the world’s lowest-cost producer of HFCS, partly be-
cause of access to cheap corn at or below world market
prices and low unit costs in large plants. HFCS repre-
sents an increasing share of per capita caloric sweeten-
ers delivered for domestic food and beverage use.
Table 1 shows the radical changes that have occurred
over time in the level and composition of U.S. sweetener
consumption. Total caloric sweetener consumption in-
creased 33 percent from the 1960-69 to 2000 average level.
HFCS use increased by 1,060 percent, and total sugar con-
sumption dropped by 33 percent. Since 2000, these
trends have tapered, and U.S. sweetener consumption
seems to have peaked. Food-processing industries and
food retailers have initiated these changes in the sweet-
ener composition of food and many consumers obviously
like them.
The beverage industry is by far the largest user of
HFCS, as shown in Table 2. Canned, bottled, and frozen
foods industry is the second-largest user. Added sugars in-
clude refined sugar, HFCS, edible syrups, and honey not
naturally occurring in food but mostly added in food pro-
cessing. By 2000, per capita consumption of added sugar
among Americans was 31 teaspoons per person per day.
U.S. Sweetener Consumption
Trends and Dietary Guidelines
Helen H. Jensen
hhjensen@iastate.edu
515-294-6253
John C. Beghin
beghin@iastate.edu
515-294-5811
The relatively high amount of added sugars is attributed to
increased consumption of foods with added sucrose or
HFCS. Soft drinks and fruit drinks contribute almost 43 per-
cent of total intake of added sweeteners. Often the caloric
sweeteners are “hidden” in prepared foods, making it diffi-
cult for consumers to determine the exact amount of added
sweetener in food items in the short run. In the long run,
consumers can observe the health consequences of their
dietary intake. The scientific literature has associated the
intake of high sweetener levels with increased risk of health
problems, including diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and
obesity. Sugar and foods containing sugars and starches
can also result in tooth decay.
The 2005 Dietary Guidelines for Americans recom-
mend choosing foods that limit the intake of added sug-
ars; balancing caloric intake from foods and beverages
with physical activity; and choosing and preparing foods
and beverages with little added sugars or caloric sweeten-
ers. Evidence suggests a positive association between the
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages and weight
gain, and that reduced intake of added sweeteners (espe-
cially sugar-sweetened beverages) may be helpful in im-
proving the quality of diets and in weight control. Limiting
intake of added sweeteners will lead to major changes in
consumption and have implications for the agricultural
sweetener sector. The U.S. Congress and some state legisla-
tures are considering bans on soft drink sales in schools
and other restrictions and food standards to curb sweet-
ener and high-energy food consumption because of the
rising cost of obesity among children and the general
population. CARD economists (Helen Jensen, John Beghin,
and Amani Elobeid) are currently analyzing the impact of
such policies on U.S. sweetener and agricultural markets.◆
TABLE 1. U.S. SWEETENER CONSUMPTION FROM 1950-59 TO 2000 (ANNUAL AVERAGES, PER CAPITA)
% Change
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000 1960-69 to 2000
Pounds per capita, dry weight
Total caloric sweeteners 110 114 124 127 146 152 33%
Cane and beet sugar 97 98 96 68 65 66 -33%
Share of industry in total 64% 60% 58% 59%
Corn sweeteners 11 15 26 57 80 85 472%
     HFCS 0 0 6 37 57 64 1,060%b
     Glucose 7 11 17 16 20 18 66.%
     Dextrose 4 4 4 4 4 3 -177%
Other caloric sweetenersa 2 2 1 1 1 2 0%
Source: USDA/ERS 2003.
Note: Totals may not add up because of rounding.
a Edible syrups (sugarcane, sorgo, maple, and refiners), edible molasses, and honey.
b Percentage change between 1970-79 and 2000.
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made. Building on the framework for
agricultural domestic support, we
recommend additional changes.
The definition of Green Box poli-
cies needs to be re-examined. Given
the possible effects of decoupled
income support and marketing,
transportation, and infrastructure
support on world trade, these pro-
grams may not truly fit the Green Box
target of minimally trade-distorting
policies. However, these programs
are not directly linked to current
production or prices and may have
large non-agricultural benefits.
Therefore, leaving them in the Green
Box but tightening the rules for them
may make the most sense.
An initially generous Green Box
definition may facilitate negotiation
of a phase-out of the Amber Box poli-
cies, which are the most damaging
distortions. Developing countries
complain about the large expendi-
tures that sustain E.U. and U.S. farm
policies. As these expenditures take
place no matter what, competing ex-
porters would be better off with
Green Box types of policies than
with Amber Box policies. However,
this change would mean that net
food-importing countries would lose
access to cheap food. The export
subsidies that keep the costs of food
down would disappear with the Am-
ber Box. But trade would be undeni-
ably much less distorted.
The current AMS framework for
market price support cannot ad-
equately reflect actual support lev-
els. The MPS examples of Japanese
rice and U.S. dairy and sugar show
the flaws in current AMS calcula-
tions for these programs. Moving to
an AMS based on current world and
domestic prices will better capture
the actual level of support and align
market price support programs with
other Amber Box programs in which
actual expenditures are used in the
calculations. An alternative would
be to remove the MPS programs from
both the AMS limits and the current
AMS calculations. The way AMS is
calculated for MPS in the current
agreement has a significant loop-
hole, allowing the possibility that
countries can make small changes in
official policy (resulting in minimal
changes in agricultural trade protec-
tion) and provide themselves large
cushions from agricultural support
reductions. Either of the proposals
suggested here would close this
loophole.
Although the framework has pro-
vided the possibility for significant
agricultural trade reform in domestic
support, the Blue Box cap proposed in
the framework is so generous that
many programs could be folded into
the Blue Box with no effective change
in policy. Actually, the MPS loopholes,
generous initial AMS bindings, and
generous Blue Box caps taken to-
gether ensure that no actual change in
aggregate support would occur. As the
agricultural framework stands now,
actual cuts in support may well have
to wait for a third round of agricultural
negotiations, unless negotiators de-
velop a sudden desire for radical re-
forms. It may help to remember that it
took eight rounds of world trade nego-
tiations to get rid of trade distortions
in manufacturing.◆
This article was drawn from a larger
working paper of the same name.
The full text is available at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/
publications/synopsis.aspx?id=557.
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TABLE 2. U.S. HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP CONSUMPTION BY TYPE OF USER (THOUSAND SHORT TONS)a
% change
Industry 1987 1992 1997 2002 1987-2002
Confectionery and related products 27 114 106 83 202%
Bakery, cereals, and allied products 411 442 402 513 25%
Ice cream and dairy products 402 568 772 258 -36%b
Canned, bottled, and frozen foods 593 647 502 686 73%
Beverages (mostly soft drinks) 3,888 3,878 5,845 6,693c 80%
Miscellaneous food manufacturing 101
Total 5,126 5,506 7,632 8,533 66%
Contribution of beverages to total
  HFCS consumption 76% 70% 77% 82%
Source: Calculated from U.S. Census Bureau data.
a For some categories and some years, the Census Bureau withholds data in order to avoid disclosing
information about individual companies or if estimates did not meet publication standards.
b The reduction in HFCS consumption by the ice cream and dairy products industry may reflect a change
in classification of the industry.
c Authors’ estimate.
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